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Abstract: 
Collective ontological security refers to the psychological human need to be part of a stable 
collective identity. Populations expect leaders to help meet these ontological needs and 
support those that do. In the Eurasian region, and in addition to other objectives, Russian 
and Kazakh presidents have used regional cooperation efforts as an elite-led strategy of 
ontological security building and reinforcement – especially important as national identities 
were contested and weak after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Focusing on ontological 
security presents a novel research perspective on Eurasian regionalism and offers a new 
(but complementary) explanation of both autocratic regional cooperation and conflict. 
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The last three decades have witnessed a marked growth in regional organisations across 
the globe – including in regions, such as Eurasia, characterised by authoritarianism.1 Overall 
however, inter-authoritarian regionalism, beset by neo-patrimonial structures unsuited to 
the political and economic liberalisation that regionalism has often promised, has delivered 
mixed results when compared with its democratic counterparts.2 Scholars have sought to 
explain this authoritarian paradox of ‘virtual regionalism’ (continued regional cooperation 
despite limited functional output) through a focus on the links between regional 
                                                          
1 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 3; Börzel, Comparative Regionalism, 8; Fawcett and Gandois, 
“Regionalism in Africa”. 
2 Collins, “Economic and Security Regionalism” 250; Kirschner and Stapel, “Does Regime Type Matter?”, 147.  
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cooperation and the informal, and to some extent non-material, authoritarian ‘regime-
boosting’ benefits of regionalism.3 Indeed, academics have identified how regional 
cooperation can help support autocratic regimes through a mixture of copying 
internationally legitimate/Western practices, faking other Western practices (such as 
election monitoring), delegitimising Western actors and rejecting their democratisation 
efforts, and offering material support to autocrats in the face of regime threats. 
This article builds on these observations, demonstrating an alternative (but 
complementary) informal and non-material driver of elite-led regional cooperation in 
Eurasia. It is based on the phenomenon of ‘collective ontological security’,4 which refers to 
the psychological need of human social groups to have a stable and secure collective 
identity. Just like physical security, most people have a profound desire for security and 
stability with regard to their identity and consider threats to this identity (that is, threats to 
their ontological security) as stressful and destabilising.5 Collective identity, the identity we 
personally derive from and share with the main social groups we belong to, is an important 
component of an individual’s sense of identity. As such, groups of people who share a 
common identity experience common angst when the collective ontological security of this 
identity is threatened. Ontologically secure individuals or groups are thus those who are 
secure of their identity, and confident that they do not face major challenges to the 
reproduction of this identity over time.6 
For many (most ?) people, national identity is the most important collective identity and it 
is considered the most important in the context of this article. Unlike many other aspects of 
our individual identity, key aspects of national identity (such as national pride, the 
reinforcement of collective past glories or injustices, a sense of national direction/progress, 
etc.) are both largely beyond the control of an individual and require cultivation by political 
leaders.  
                                                          
3 Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures”, 185; Söderbaum, ”With a Little Help”, 7; Collins, 
Economic and Security Regionalism”, 250; Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia”, 486-7.  
4 Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism”; Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”; Steele, 
Ontological Security in International Relations; Croft, “Constructing Ontological Insecurity”; Darwich, The 
Ontological (In)security of Similarity.  
5 The importance of personal ontological security is well established in the literatures on psychology and 
psychiatry. See for example Padgett, “There’s no place like (a) home”. 
6 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”.  
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This article suggests that in the complex period of post-Cold War history in Eurasia, in 
which collective identities have been radically altered by the break-up of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the turbulent establishment of independent states 
with new national identities, regionalism has served as a strategy to help build and 
reinforce the ‘collective ontological security’ of national identities, including those of 
Kazakhstan and Russia, the case studies that will be looked at in this article. In that respect, 
it provides an additional legitimising narrative to which regime leaders can anchor their 
symbolic power, helping them cope with the conflicting identities, norms, values and 
loyalties that typically unfold in transitional societies. Viewing regionalism in terms of 
ontological security strategies thus paves the way for considering the effects of regionalism 
beyond the material performance of regional integration.   
However, there is no linear relationship between regional cooperation and increased 
collective ontological security as the actions needed to ensure the security of one collective 
national identity may thwart the fulfilment of another. By implication, regional interaction 
can serve both to shape and reinforce as well as to challenge the ontological security of a 
collective national identity. Likewise, collective identity boosting may drive regional 
cooperation strategies, but the need to support collective identities may weaken 
cooperation when the latter threatens collective ontological security. This ontological-
security explanation for regionalism amongst authoritarian leaders can thus help to 
account for both the respective drives towards, but also some of the conflict involved in, 
regional cooperation between authoritarian states. The article sheds further light on the 
‘virtual regionalism’ paradox of why states invest time in underperforming regional bodies 
whilst offering an additional explanation for the challenge posed by moving beyond weak 
regional structures in autocratic regions. 
This article comprises four sections. The first illustrates how scholars have sought to explain 
the ‘virtual regionalism’ paradox to date. The second section discusses ontological security 
conceptually and sets out the methodological approach and assumptions that underpin the 
article. The third section discusses the ‘identity crises’ thought to have beset Russia and 
Kazakhstan since the collapse of the USSR and the way different strategies of regional 
cooperation have been employed to build and shape collective identity in response. The 
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fourth section documents how the regional level presents both opportunities and risks for 
bolstering ontological security.  
 
Regionalism and regime-boosting  
Over the last decade, regional organisations have been increasingly studied also as 
instruments enhancing regime security in authoritarian states.7 Roy Allison, for example, 
has identified how regional cooperation in Central Asia offers “protective integration”, 
which refers to “a form of collective political solidarity with Russia against international 
political processes or agendas that are interpreted as challenging politically incumbent 
regimes”.8 Similarly, referring to sub-Saharan Africa, Fredrik Söderbaum has described the 
“regime-boosting” features of regionalism that aim “to strengthen the status, legitimacy 
and the general interests of the political regime (rather than the nation-state per se)”.9 
Söderbaum argues that regionalism can be used as “an image-boosting instrument”10 that 
allows leaders collectively to support one another and their regimes; furthermore, regional 
events present an image of national leaders fully in charge of their sovereign states.  
Drawing on different strands of literature, both on regionalism per se and how 
authoritarian rule unfolds internationally - and regionally, it is possible to identify four regime-
boosting mechanisms by which regional bodies reinforce domestic elites:  
 emulation and localisation of international (allegedly or perceivably) legitimate 
practices,  
 creation of façade-legitimating devices,  
 delegitimation of Western norms and advancement of alternative values, and  
                                                          
7 Following a rather different path, the link between the membership to certain regional organisations and the 
resilience or consolidation of the authoritarian regimes of their respective members has been studied not in 
terms of causality (membership strengthens autocracies) but rather of precondition: “the clustering of non-
democracies within certain organisations may result from the fact that […] autocracies should find easier to 
cooperate with each other than with other regimes […] or that authoritarian countries are less frequently 
admitted into international organisations created by democracies”. Libman, “Supranational Organisations”, 
133-4.  
8 Allison, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures”, 185. 
9 Söderbaum, ”With a Little Help”, 6; and “Modes of Regional Governance in Africa”.  
10 Söderbaum, ”With a Little Help”, 7.  
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 material support.11  
The first mechanism can be observed, for example, in Latin America, West and Southern 
Africa and the former Soviet Union, where regional bodies have adopted structures that 
closely mirror those of the EU. While perceptions of the EU have been dented since the 
financial crisis and Brexit, for a time adopting European structures and processes and 
mimicking the pre-eminent West brought a certain form of prestige and sense of progress. 
A telling example is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which declared a 
commitment to setting regional standards in terms of human rights and democracy in the 
early 1990s. At that time, the CIS (and its member states) were seeking a place in the 
international community and trying to acquire the reputation and semblance of a ‘proper’ 
regional organisation. In some cases, the reference to the European model was explicitly 
set down in official documents and statements; in other cases, the influence of the 
European model was manifest in the acceptance of an emerging ‘meta-norm’ about the 
transformative impact of regional organisations and the exercise of hegemony through 
‘normative power’.12  
A second mechanism is the establishment of façade institutions. In recent years, a well-
developed literature has documented the way regional bodies can be used to hide 
illegitimate practices. The most obvious are regional election monitors who provide 
contrasting opinions to observers from Western countries. In Eurasia, two organisations – 
the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – stand out. Following the 
‘colour revolutions’, where flawed elections triggered uprisings, the CIS sent its own 
observers to counterbalance Western monitors. The CIS observations uniformly endorsed 
the (re-)election of incumbents, diverging considerably in the vast majority of cases from 
those of observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
For example, in 2006, the CIS endorsed the re-election of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, 
claiming that the process was “legitimate, free and transparent”, whilst OSCE/Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) observers noted that the elections fell 
                                                          
11 Libman instead refers to five mechanisms of regime-boosting through regional organisations, namely 
legitimacy provision, economic support, governance transfer, mutual learning of the regimes and impact of 
private business interests. These mechanisms can be ascribed to either democracy promotion, or democracy 
diffusion, or a mix of the two. Libman, “Supranational Organisations”, 134-5.  
12 See Russo, “A ‘Potemkin Village’?”.  
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short of both Uzbekistan’s OSCE commitments and “international standards for 
democratic elections”.13 Similar dynamics have been observed in numerous elections in the 
region.14 
Third, regional fora provide an additional opportunity for authoritarian regimes to 
collectively delegitimatise Western values and advance alternative norms. Indeed, both the 
CIS and SCO are often used to contest Western perceptions of legitimacy and open up 
normative space for alternative models of political order. Both organisations promote a 
pluralism in international affairs that provides space for autocratic states to solidify their 
rule and reject contrasting models. For example, reflecting the so-called ‘Shanghai Spirit’, a 
set of common norms and understandings held by SCO members, the SCO ‘Declaration on 
the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’ celebrates the “diversity of 
civilization[s] and model[s] of development”, highlights “differences in cultural traditions, 
political and social systems, values and model[s] of development” and notes that “[m]odels 
of social development should not be ‘exported’”.15 The effect is a collective delegitimation 
of ‘foreign interference’ and a collective legitimation of the principle of each regime’s right 
to self-determination.16 
Fourth and finally, regional projects and associated interactions can provide material 
support that benefits authoritarian elites. For example, during the Arab Spring, the richer 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provided financial support to less well-off 
members to assist them with new public spending pledges.17 Along similar lines, in 
September 2011, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) conducted military 
exercises that also trained the group’s militaries in preventing possible popular uprisings. 
On that occasion, CSTO’s Secretary General, Nikolai Bordyuzha, declared that the 
organisation had extended its mission, including the management of internal upheaval in 
member countries and the restoration of public order.18  
                                                          
13 Cited in Fawn, “Battle over the Box”, 1144.  
14 Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules.  
15 SCO, Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Shanghai, 2006, 
http://eng.sectsco.org/load/197680/. 
16 Jackson, “The role of external factors”. 
17 Yom, “Authoritarian Monarchies”, 60.  
18 Piras and Russo, “Democratic Diffusion Failures”.  
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As seen, when referring to authoritarian promotion/diffusion through regional 
organisations, post-Soviet regionalisms provide several empirical examples.19 Looking at 
the regional organisations that have emerged in the former Soviet area from this angle of 
authoritarian regime boosting helps in reconsidering and understanding their role and 
performativity. Indeed, while post-Soviet regionalisms have often been considered at 
different times as dysfunctional and non-effective, their effects should be assessed not only 
in terms of their stated functions but also in terms of the regime boosting practices they 
convey20. The respective literature too often suggests that post-Soviet regionalisms are 
equal to their institutional embodiments, that is, regional organisations that have 
proliferated in the former Soviet area. Post-Soviet regional organisations are themselves 
often referred to as unsuccessful projects that have failed to stimulate further integration 
or other forms of regional governance.21 In other words, scrutiny beyond regionally-scaled 
policymaking processes and outputs seems to be rare. Moreover, counting the number of 
regional organisations, looking at their institutional design and/or their formal and codified 
expressions, and interpreting them solely in terms of power politics do not seem to take 
into consideration the whole problematique.22 As a result, other conceptual grounds have to 
be broken, grounds that acknowledge the peculiarities of the post-Soviet region23 – without 
straying into exceptionalism. 
Ontological security and regionalism: concepts and methods 
While the regime-boosting effects described above have been highlighted in the literature, 
a fifth dimension – the opportunity that regionalism provides for reinforcing the ontological 
security of core political support bases – remains under-examined. Yet, opportunities to 
shape and bolster collective ontological security represent an important boon for 
authoritarian leaders, irrespective of the functional effectiveness of the regional bodies. As 
will be described below, regionalism, which offers a means both of expressing collective 
identity at the national level and of establishing, and in some cases codifying, the recurring 
                                                          
 
20 See for example Libman and Obydenkova, “Informal governance and participation”.  
21 See for example Kubicek 2009.  
22 Russo, Regions in Transition. 
23 Libman and Vinokurov, “Holding-Together Regionalism”.  
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patterns of interactions with important neighbouring states that ensure this collective 
identity over time can play a key role in ensuring collective ontological security. 
This section outlines the concept of collective ontological security in the International 
Relations (IR) field, and highlights the importance of the regional context for the shaping of 
national identity and its security (collective ontological security). It also discusses the 
methodological approach and assumptions of the article.  
The notion of ‘ontological security’ has added an important conceptual apparatus to 
discussions of security in International Relations. At the level of individual psychology, 
‘ontologically security’ refers to a person’s need for a stable understanding of his/her self-
identity and, importantly, confidence in the continuity of this self-identity and the ability to 
reproduce it over time.24  
The preservation of an individual’s ontological security is nonetheless a deeply social 
phenomenon resting often on the collective identities the person feels a part of. Indeed, 
individuals are strongly attached to the cognitive stability offered by the collective identity 
that is shared intersubjectively within the societies in which they live.25 Correspondingly, a 
number of scholars have argued that ontological security can and should be analysed at the 
collective level including, most importantly for IR, the level of the state.26 As Steele has 
argued, the drive to minimise ontological insecurity is so strong that it can override 
otherwise rational considerations, with states engaging in physical insecurity inducing or 
economically detrimental activities in their attempts to reinforce ontological security.27 
Collective understandings of identity are defined in conjunction with or in opposition to 
other communities – the most important of which, at the international level, are other 
states. The ‘routineisation’ of relations and practices with other groups (including state-
state relations) serves to “help maintain identity coherence for each group, which in turn 
provide individuals with a measure of ontological security”.28  
                                                          
24 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”, 342. 
25 Ibid., 352. 
26 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation”, 385; Ibid., 351-2. 
27 Steele, “Ontological Security in International Relations”, 4-5. 
28 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”, 352.  
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Regional organisations and states’ associated foreign relations with neighbours in their 
region are essential in this regard. Above all because state identities are shaped inter-
subjectively with other states. The states that are most geographically proximate and with 
which a state interacts most often play a disproportionate role in the definition of one’s 
national identity (for example, in the cases described later, defining what ‘Kazakhness’ is is 
achieved in part in relation to Eurasianness, Central-Asianness, Post-Sovietness, etc.). As 
such, the regional level and the ensuing regional interaction is a particularly potent forum 
for strengthening collective ontological security.  
As most strategies for increasing security are determined as responses to perceived 
insecurities or threats, the methodology employed here involves tracing the key collective 
identity insecurities generated in Russia and Kazakhstan by the end of the Cold War, and 
showing how regional cooperation strategies and the elaboration of regional projects and 
postures by leaders have responded to these challenges. The article uses discourse analysis 
of speeches and statements made by Russian and Kazakh leaders, as well as 
representatives of the latest instance of Eurasian integration, the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), to evidence how regionalism can be used to build and reinforce identity markers. 
We assume this is a largely rational and conscious process on the part of state leaders who 
in both Russia and Kazakhstan have been the key drivers of regional initiatives. While 
leaders may not speak in terms of ontological security, they are more than aware of the 
benefits of reinforcing identity markers for citizens and the risks in terms of reduced 
political support if they do not. Different ‘experiments’ of Eurasian regionalism have 
reportedly failed to generate substantial economic and political benefits; yet they have 
been designed so as to promote non-material benefits from the regime’s point of view.  
While it is beyond the scope of this article to determine the effectiveness of this strategy, 
our endeavour is to shed light on how regional institutions and projects in the former Soviet 
space are often created by member states’ rulers as carriers of ontological security 
provisions. In particular, we focus on the case of the Eurasian Economic Union as it has 
introduced two elements of novelty with respect to previous instances of post-Soviet 
regionalism (from the Commonwealth of Independent States to the latest variable-
geometry developments): 1) disagreements and differences of opinions among Russian, 
Kazakh and Belarus presidents Vladimir Putin, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Alexander 
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Lukashenko are not hidden behind a façade of consensus and summitry rituality; 2) 
opposition to the Eurasian Economic Union has emerged in the agenda of groups of 
dissidents at both the national and transnational levels.  
The added value of looking at ontological security is the shift in focus from inter-state 
legitimation (regimes seek their legitimation before external audiences) to legitimation 
also vis-à-vis (limited sectors of why limited ?) internal constituencies that may support 
Eurasian regionalism and consequently their ‘founding fathers’ for two equal and opposite 
reasons: narratives manufactured to present Eurasian regionalism provide collective 
identity anchors; and instances of resistance and contestation of the Eurasian project 
occurring within regional fora are presented to the public as moments to assert national 
interests and national distinctiveness against the background of the ‘regional whole’.  
Ontological security provisions enter the strategic agendas of newly-launched institutions 
such as the EAEU (as will be shown later), as a way to offer collective structures of self-
identification and narratives to draw on. It is noteworthy that the EAEU has organised two 
events to promote the fabrication of a Eurasian collective identity and storytelling: in 2014 
the Eu rasian Economic Commission (EEC) Press Office, jointly with the Russian Public 
Relations Association, held a seminar to discuss the specifics of disseminating information 
about the EAEU and, in the words of the Eurasian Communications Centre Press Secretary, 
the “formation of a new meta-plot framework”;- and in 2015 the EEC and the Russian 
International Affairs Council organised a summer school to promote the formation of a 
Eurasian community of experts and journalists specialising in Eurasian integration. 
 
Ontological insecurities in Russia and Kazakhstan 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left both populations and rulers in successor states with 
several identity problems to solve and identity-based conflicts to appease.  
The question of Russian identity has always been difficult to specify. Indeed, straddling not 
only multiple ethnicities but also continents, defining what is ‘Russianness’ has been a 
preoccupation of Russians themselves for centuries. However, following the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, Russia experienced “a crisis of identity and national self-consciousness”.29 
Early debates in the 1990s were dominated by disagreement between two poles: on the 
one side, ‘Westerners’ who saw Russia as a ‘European/Western’ country;30 on the other side, 
‘fundamentalist nationalists’ who defined ‘Russianness’ quite differently, asserting Russia’s 
distinctiveness from the West, arguing that Russia’s ‘home’ was in Eurasia and reaffirming 
Russia’s great power status.31  
To some extent these issues were temporarily settled by the coming to power of Putin and 
the success of the so-called ‘pragmatic nationalists’ who initially took a middle position but 
have taken a more nationalist stance over time.32 However, questions of Russian identity 
remain open, particularly in relation to several international dimensions: Russia’s place 
between East and West, Russia’s relations with its neighbours, and the way in which 
Russia’s ‘great power status’ should be practiced and attained. As will be described below, 
regional integration and cooperation provides some answers to these questions, but in 
somewhat problematic ways for both Russia and its neighbours. 
For Kazakhstan, defining a national identity also proved a challenge after the collapse of 
the USSR. The country emerged from the Soviet Union as host to over 100 nationalities 
with the Kazakh authorities thus facing a series of major tests: First, how to establish a new, 
sovereign and independent Kazakh state, which had not existed previously in a 
Westphalian sense (although the Kazakh Steppe had long been settled by nomadic 
Kazakhs) Like neighbouring Kyrgyzstan,33 Kazakhstan was developing statehood largely 
from scratch, not having experienced the (albeit brief) periods of statehood enjoyed by 
other USSR-successor states such as Georgia, Latvia or Estonia. Second, how to create a 
harmonious internal social system   bridging the divide between ethnic Kazakhs and the 
ethnic Russians who now found themselves in the new state of Kazakhstan? The legitimacy 
of Nazarbayev’s regime rested on the realisation of these objectives of interethnic 
harmony, statehood and sovereignty. 
                                                          
29 Kortunov, The Fate of Russia; Light, In search of an identity, 2003.  
30 Light, In search of an identity, 44. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Light, “In search of an identity”, 45. 
33 Cf. Huskey, “National identity from scratch”. 
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Relations with Russia (and with ‘Russianness’) are central to the post-independence Kazakh 
identity. Russian nationalistic notions of regional leadership are problematic for 
Kazakhstan, and independence from major powers on the world stage (including Russia) is 
a defining feature of Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vector foreign policy’. Indeed, Nazarbayev has 
used Kazakh foreign policy and international positioning as an important tool of identity 
and legitimacy-shaping.34 However, the role that Russia plays in the Kazakh identity is 
complicated by the sizeable Russian minority in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh regime has in 
many ways done remarkably well following independence in terms of inter-ethnic accord. 
Despite the plurality of different ethnic groups in the country, Kazakhstan has mostly 
avoided the major ethnic tensions seen in neighbouring countries (a feat Russia has not 
managed).  
Yet, post-independence Kazakhstan has seen what some would consider the ethnic-
Kazakhisation of the country, with Kazakh adopted as an official language, new statues 
erected exulting (ethnic) Kazaks, and street names changed into Kazakh, amongst other 
things. Many non-ethnic Kazakhs, disturbed by these changes, voted with their feet, with 
over 1 million leaving the country between 1993 and 1999.35 At the same time, however, 
Nazarbayev has promoted civic dimensions of nationalism, seeking to form a broad 
umbrella identity for all Kazakh citizens within which different ethnic groups can co-exist. 
Indeed, Nazarbayev’s role as a moderating figure mediating these potential ethnic tensions 
is the source of much of his political support.36  
 
Russia and Kazakhstan go regional: strategies to seek ontological security  
Both the Russian and Kazakh governments face divergent, but overlapping challenges in 
terms of building and reinforcing collective ontological security in Eurasia. The situation 
however is different for Kazakhstan and Russia. In Kazakhstan, the government has had to 
deliver and build new forms of identity that unify ethnic Kazakhs without alienating ethnic 
Russians. For Russia, by contrast, there are centuries of national and imperial history to 
build on and an increasingly nationalist view of Russian history that can be emphasised. 
                                                          
34 Anceschi, “Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy”. 
35 Ó Beacháin and  Kevlihan, “State-building, Identity and Nationalism”, 4.  
36 Ibid., 10.  
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Regional cooperation offers opportunities for both leaders to build their collective 
identities, and reinforce them over time.  
Russia: major power status, Russia’s ‘place in the world’ and domestic-regional mirroring 
The policies and practices of Eurasian integration allow for (an at least partial) realisation of 
these sentiments. First, Eurasian integration facilitates regional policies and processes that 
allow Russian leaders to demonstrate their great power status and regional leadership. 
Given Russia’s position as leader within Eurasian integration projects, the logic of Eurasian 
integration for Russian elites implies that the “larger the Eurasian Union, the stronger 
Russia’s great power image will be – domestically and internationally”.37 
Second, it answers – or at least diffuses – certain questions about Russian identity and 
Russia’s place in the (post-Cold War) world. As noted above, Russia’s identity within the 
international system has always been uneasy.38 While Russia adopted a European 
orientation following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this perspective has always been 
questioned,39 leaving Russia caught between a number of different European/Western and 
Eurasian identities. In counter this, Putin has highlighted the common civilisational bonds 
that underpin regional integration efforts in Eurasia.40 
Third, Eurasian integration – from a Russian perspective – mirrors at the regional level 
perceptions about the domestic relations between core and peripheral regions (and thus 
ethnicities) within Russia itself. On this point, the Russian view of Eurasianism, unlike the 
Kazakh view, seeks to reproduce the internal self-perception of the dominant domestic 
group at a regional level. The common bonds of distinct Eurasian civilisation do not mean 
equal status between Eurasian states. The Russian state is often thought (by the Russian 
presidential entourage) to be the primary force within the ostensive Eurasian civilisational 
context, and the neo-Eurasianist notions of the Russian leadership are seen as essential and 
in some way natural to many Russians. That these Eurasianist sentiments are mirrored both 
in certain strands of Russian nationalism and the official state discourse, adds weight to 
their application in the context of the Eurasian Union. From the Russian empire to the 
                                                          
37 Popescu, Eurasian Union, 19.  
38 Sakwa, “Russia’s Identity”, 957.  
39 Tsygankov, “Mastering space in Eurasia”, 102.  
40 Putin, A new integration project.  
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Soviet Union to the post-Soviet period of today, ethnic Russians within Russia have been 
encouraged to identify with Russia as a whole rather than with their ethnic group.41 This 
identity nuance sees Moscow and ethnic Russians as indispensable leaders at the centre of 
two concentric circles – first within Russia itself, and then secondly, within the post-Soviet 
space. Taken together, in some sectors in Russia these self-perceptions create both an 
expectation of Russian leadership and an identity-based affinity with political and economic 
projects that stretch across the Eurasian borders of the newly independent states. 
Kazakhstan: sovereignty and prestige, modern statehood and the regional mirroring of a 
multi-ethnic identity 
One of the most important benefits of regional integration for the Kazakh leadership is the 
opportunity it offers to demonstrate Kazakh statehood: public expressions of the 
pragmatic, voluntary, gradual nature of Eurasian integration, and the acceptance of this 
stance by Russia, provide significant legitimacy-boosting effects for the regime.42 The 
spectre of Russia lies behind many of Nazarbayev’s comments on the Eurasian Union. He 
regularly highlights how the ‘mutual’ interests of EAEU members have been considered, 
underlining that Russia has negotiated with and acquiesced to Kazakh demands. This 
demonstrates, perhaps rhetorically more than in practice, how Russia and Kazakhstan are 
now equals (unlike the past) and how Kazakhstan is now a fully sovereign nation. 
Nazarbayev is quite explicit about this at times, stressing how the EAEU “shall strengthen 
the immutable principles of political sovereignty and independence [and the] cultural and 
linguistic uniqueness of our peoples”.  
Furthermore, the Kazakh government’s engagement with Eurasian integration is regularly 
invoked as evidence of the prestige and importance of the Kazakh state, as Nazarbayev’s 
speeches on the Eurasian Union show: “For the first time in history, an economic union with 
a powerful natural and resource potential, strategically important in terms of global and 
regional transport, energy and technology systems is being created on the vast expanses of 
Eurasia”. Nazarbayev also stresses how the EAEU encourages cooperation (on mutually 
beneficial, that is equal terms) with the European Union (EU), thus highlighting how the 
EAEU is the EU’s equal and therefore again, by association, linking Kazakhstan (which he 
                                                          
41 Duncan, “Contemporary Russian Identity”, 282.  
42 Anceschi, “Regime-building, identity-making and foreign policy”, 738.  
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establishes is at the heart of the EAEU) with the status of the EU and its member states.43 
Events associated with Regional cooperation also offer opportunities here for summitry.44 
Attendance at such events, with photos of Nazarbayev at the top table often next to Putin 
reproduced in national news, serve to reinforce the prestige of Kazakhstan as an important country 
in terms of regional integration. 
Finally, Eurasian regional cooperation presents opportunities for the Kazakh leadership to 
bolster its domestic identity as a multi-ethnic state. Eurasian integration has indeed served 
to provide a meta-narrative of ethnic harmony in Eurasia that mirrors efforts to do the 
same domestically. Kazakh neo-Eurasianism has been framed by the Nazarbayev regime as 
taking the form of a “civilizational dialogue” between East and West: promoting a balanced 
regional order that harmoniously brings together Eastern and Western cultures is similar to 
the challenge Kazakhstan faces in terms of developing inter-ethnic tolerance and harmony 
at the national level. While Nazarbayev himself has noted in speeches how the EAEU 
“strengthen[s] friendship, good neighborliness and trust between their countries and 
peoples”,45 the Kazakh government has also publicly drawn links between ‘Eurasia’ and 
‘Nazarbayev’s’ capital city, Astana, noting how he has overseen the development of the 
capital so that it reflects both European and Asian cultures and styles.46 In this sense, 
Kazakhstan’s regional identity as a regional bridge or intermediary supports efforts to build 
a multi-ethnic identity domestically. This is further enhanced by Nazarbayev’s 
establishment in Astana in 2003 of the ‘Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional 
Religions’, held every three years with the goal of achieving “mutual respect and tolerance 
between religions, confessions and ethnoses”.47  
 
Ontological security-boosting in the context of Eurasian integration 
The story of the Eurasian project can be recounted in four main periods:  
                                                          
43 All quotes in this section up to here from Urazova, Nazarbayev Speaks About Launching. 
44 As described by Söderbaum, ”With a Little Help”.  
45 Urazova, Nazarbayev Speaks About Launching. 
46 Mayor’s Office of Astana, History of Astana,2016, http://astana.gov.kz/en/modules/material/42  
47 Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, 2018, http://www.religions-
congress.org/content/blogcategory/18/32/lang,english/. 
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1. “Eurasian union prior to the Eurasian Union”, that is, Nazarbayev’s initiatives in the 
nineties. For example, in a speech at Lomonosov Moscow State University on 29 March 
1994, the Kazakh President first envisioned the creation of a “new unity” out of a “space 
that used to be one country”;48  
2. “The incubation of a measure for measure”: the period that goes from the launch of the 
European Union’s Eastern Partnership (targeting some of the countries belonging to the 
so-called ‘overlapping’ or ‘shared’ neighbourhood) to the publication on 3 October 2011 of 
the article by Putin entitled “A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the 
making”;49 
3. “The preparatory works and negotiations”: the period that goes from the Declaration on 
Eurasian Economic Integration to the entry into force of the Treaty on the Eurasian 
Economic Union (2011-2015), including the development of a proto-enlargement policy 
targeting Armenia and Kyrgyzstan;  
4. The early stages of operation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which correspond to the 
mandate of the first Chairman of the Eurasian Commission, Viktor Khristenko (2012-2016). 
The ontological security provisions were analysed be scrutinising a set of 47 documents 
(transcripts of interviews and speeches, statements, addresses) related to the 
establishment and institutionalisation of the Eurasian Economic Union, selected mainly 
from two websites (www.eaeunion.org; http://kremlin.ru), and then processed usinga 
discursive approach. These documents come from the last two stages of development.  
Both Russian and Kazakh leaders tend to depict the project as aiming at the citizens’ well-
being: accordingly, Putin and Nazarbayev often refer to their domestic constituencies 
(people, nations, citizens) and to the new material opportunities that stem from the 
integration process: 
                                                          
48 Nurbekov, “Eurasian Economic Integration ‘Will Continue,’ Nazarbayev Says”.  
49 Putin, “A new integration project for Eurasia”. 
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I am happy to say that there is popular consensus on this idea in Russia. […] The 
citizens of our countries should be able to fully assess the benefits of Eurasian 
integration. (Putin, 29 May 2014)50 
It is very important that the public in our countries broadly supports this policy of 
closer integration. […] We need to repay this very high level of trust with tangible 
results and continued improvements in the well-being and living standards of our 
peoples. (Putin, 10 October 2014)51 
While such reference to the citizens may signal a strategy for ontological security, two 
caveats should be highlighted. On the one hand, the integration process does not provide 
for the involvement of civil society and the non-governmental sector in the official debate 
(see below); on the other, Putin himself has specified that the spectacle of Eurasian 
integration has an ad hoc audience that is not the common people (more targeted by the 
narratives of the ‘Russian world’52), but rather an emerging community of entrepreneurs 
and businessmen, in addition to experts, officials and members of government:  
Taking into account the interests of the business community has become a priority 
direction for integration cooperation. The Eurasian Economic Commission has 
established close cooperation with our nations’ business associations and is 
consulting with entrepreneurs on improving the regulatory framework of the 
Customs Union and the Common Economic Space. [… B]usiness representatives […] 
are the co-authors of all these documents. (Putin, 5 March 2014)53 
Moreover, there is common ground as to how the supranational component of integration 
should be reconciled with sovereignty: both presidents agree that the Eurasian project is 
rooted in national interests. However, the two presidents tend to emphasize slightly 
different aspects of the pragmatism enshrined in the EAEU’s institutional mission and 
design. Putin’s vision is quite straightforward in this regard: the EAEU should be oriented 
“to creat[ing] favourable conditions for the development of our economies in order to 
maintain stability, security and prosperity in Eurasia” [Italics added].54 Therefore, the 
                                                          
50 Press Statements Following the Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Astana, May 29th 2014, 
Press Statements Following the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council Meeting, Astana, 29 May 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/45790.  
51Summit of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (Opening Remarks at the Summit of the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council), Minsk, 10 October 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46767.  
52 Laruelle, The “Russian World”, 2015.  
53 Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Novo-Ogaryovo, 5 March  2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20377 . 
54  Press Statements Following the Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Astana, 29 May 2014.  
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ultimate objective is quite conservative and consistent in that respect with the missions of 
previous experiments of post-Soviet regionalism. Nazarbayev, on the other hand, while 
underlining the protection of sovereignty and national interests, also accentuates the 
elements of innovation of the Eurasian project, stressing the aim of modernisation:  
We are creating a fundamentally new model for good neighbourly relations and 
interaction between peoples in the great Eurasian space. Its foundation is the high 
level of trust, firm friendship, and mutual support between our governments, tested 
over history. The Eurasian Economic Union means new opportunities, first and 
foremost for millions of our nations’ citizens.55  
At the same time, Nazarbayev’s interpretation of the EAEU also contains elements of 
conservatism:  
We are uniting our economic potential for the prosperity of our nations. The union is, 
first and foremost, economic and does not touch on issues of member states’ 
independence or political sovereignty in the integration process.56  
In addition, and somehow in contrast to this, Nazarbayev’s narrative on the Eurasian 
project contains a ‘romanticizing’ element that balances the abovementioned pragmatism: 
the Union is rooted in traditional relations among the countries involved, and in a long-term 
vision that he himself has inspired, to the extent that he has recommended the idea of 
creating an epic and collective memory for the Eurasian Economic Union: “I feel that May 
29 is worthy of being memorialised on our calendars as Eurasian Integration Day”.57 
A further element of dissonance between Putin’s and Nazarbayev’s Eurasianist agendas can 
be found in the way the two presidents frame the role of the EAEU in the international 
environment: this ‘dossier’ not only discloses dissimilar understandings of the Union’s 
external projection, but also different ideas about its development path and its ‘encounters’ 
with European integration.  
In general, we can speak of a ‘love/hate’ relationship with the European Union, leading to 
an ambivalent process of ‘othering’.58 The EU is admittedly acknowledged as a model: the 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Wendt defines identification with the ‘other’ as “a continuum from negative to positive – from conceiving 
the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self” (Wendt, “Collective Identity 
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former Chairman of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Viktor Khristenko,59 described the 
European Union as the “most advanced form of integration in the world”.60 However, while 
it has frequently been defined as a prototype, its fundamental role vis-à-vis the EAEU 
remains to provide lessons so as to avoid its mistakes. The EU’s two faults most frequently 
identified by officials and representatives of the EAEU are the preference for widening 
rather than deepening integration, and the shift from an economic and pragmatic rationale 
to a political and emotional logic of integration.  
Furthermore, whereas the competitive co-existence of the two integration processes has 
been considered a positive incentive for the EAEU’s effectiveness, and a dialogue with the 
EU has been envisioned, any suggestion of overlapping membership has been – 
unsurprisingly – ruled out. The metaphor used by Khristenko in that respect is telling:  
- Can it [Ukraine] join both? 
- Probably, it would be the best alternative. However, it is impossible to be a member 
of two customs unions at the same time. It is similar to polygamy (laughing). 
- Yes, it’s not customary for the Slavs. 
- Open polygamy at least (laughing).61  
 
Along the continuum of this love/hate relationship with the EU, Putin and Nazarbayev 
position themselves differently and embody the process of othering in different ways. Both 
their positions are in line with the general orientation of creating bridges between Europe 
and Asia, avoiding any official discourse about an either/or choice between European and 
Eurasian integration, which are considered complementary. However, for Russia there is a 
direct link between the EU’s involvement in its Eastern neighbourhood, the fragmentation 
of the ‘near abroad’ and the crisis in Ukraine, which makes the encounter between the two 
integration processes a sensitive and not univocally positive matter:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Formation”, 386). See also Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations”; Reinke de Buitrago, 
“Introduction: Othering in International Relations”,  xxvii.  
59 On 1 February 2016, Armenia’s former Prime Minister, Tigran Sargsyan, took the Chair.  
60 V. Khristenko, “Decisions are taken by the Commission on a collegial basis”, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 12 
May 2012. 
61 Vedomosti, Interview with Victor Khristenko: “The efficiency of integration within the Customs Union 
determines the attitude of other states to integration within the CES”, 19 December 2012. 
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We feel that this kind of open market is very dangerous for us; it is unacceptable at 
today’s stage of our economic development. […]Ukraine is required to implement the 
European Union’s technical regulations within its territory. […] But Ukraine is not 
joining as a full member, and I don’t think there are any loans or any sort of benefits 
for it.62  
EU-EAEU relations are also intimately intertwined with various ideas about EAEU’s 
international dimension, as well as the direction in which to advance in the future. 
Nazarbayev seems to consider the EAEU one of the carriers moving his country away from 
the Central Asian peripheries and towards a globalised position.63 Putin’s ambition, on the 
other hand, is to make the EAEU itself a new pole of international politics. “Wherever I go 
and whomever I meet – everyone wants to know how to establish relations with the new 
Eurasian Union.”64  
From these two subtle differences portraying EAEU’s international actorness flow two 
moderately dissimilar positions on how to develop the Union further. In contrast to Putin’s 
overstressed enthusiasm vis-à-vis the Union’s global outreach, Nazarbayev’s position is 
more prudent65, and is shared by a number of EAEU officials and representatives.66  
                                                          
62 Press Conference Following the Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Minsk, 24 October 
2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19485. 
63 “Astana’s history already includes bright pages in international events. These include the Congress of 
Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, the OSCE summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
summit, meetings of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and other international organisations. We are 
preparing to host the Expo 2017 World Exhibition here” (Press Statements Following the Meeting of the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Astana, 29 May 2014).  
64 Press Statements Following the Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Astana, 29 May 2014. 
65 “We are therefore very cautious in our approach to taking in new members. The working group first needs 
to study the economic level in the prospective member country, the level of reforms that have been carried 
out, and how well suited our economies are to each other in integration terms” (N. Nazarbayev, Press 
Conference Following the Meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, Minks, 24 October 2013).  
66 “Depth is similar to roots. No leaves will grow without them. A blow of wind will crush the tree! Large-scale 
expansion of the union requires a considerable depth of integration” (Interview by Victor Khristenko to 
Vedomosti: “The efficiency of integration within the Customs Union determines the attitude of other states 
to integration within the CES”, 19 December 2012, 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/19-12-2012.aspx); “Currently, overleaping certain 
stages or incomplete achievement of the goals, which have already been set, and passing to new goals would 
be dangerous. The EU experience shows that rush can result in great problems at a later stage” (Interview by 
Andrei Slepnyov to Interfax News Agency: “The New Eurasian Economic Union will not be a simple sum of 
today’s legal framework and agreements reached”, 25 December 2012, 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/25-12-2012-2.aspx); “We are moving step by step. In 
order to avoid that the integration building is swept away by the first hurricane, we need depth, we need a 
solid foundation” (Ogonyok, “Interview with Viktor Khristenko” 28 September 2015, 
http://www.eurasiancommission.org/en/nae/news/Pages/29-09-2015-4.aspx).  
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Against this background, there is however an interesting point of convergence between the 
two narratives: that is, the identification of the Union as the acme of the presidents’ 
political endeavours to reorganise the former Soviet region. 67 
The pace, nature and certain peculiarities of this movement are a thing to be 
discussed by the presidents. […] A priori, they play a definitive role. At the current 
stage of this project, the presidents play not only a role of the bearers of political will, 
but also those of the main law maker.68  
We are glad that the “path” for making decisions at the current integration stage is much 
shorter than the common one; in fact, presidents act as lawmakers. Though there is huge 
responsibility for the preparation of decisions.69  
 
CONCLUSION  
There are number of ways in which regional cooperation in Eurasia serves to boost 
ontological security in Kazakhstan and Russia. Eurasian integration impacts on two 
essential dimensions of collective identity and national self-perception, namely: a) 
questions of national progress and development and b) questions pertaining to regional 
dynamics. In the first instance, regional cooperation via the Eurasian Economic Union 
presents a collective opportunity to boost ontological security in each respective country in 
ways that are mutually supportive (or at least not conflicting). The second dimension is 
more complex however, with Russian collective identification as a great power and regional 
leader clashing with Kazakh perceptions of growing sovereignty and independence.  
As the case studies above have shown, the approaches of Russia and Kazakhstan to 
Eurasian integration may boost ontological security. Leaders in both countries have 
adopted strategies towards regional cooperation that have the potential to bolster 
collective ontological security in their respective countries. However, the interaction of 
these strategies, given their contradictions, has the potential to do the opposite. Collective 
                                                          
67 See also the interview by Andrei Slepnyov, where he stated that “the Presidents agreed to […]personally 
address all road forks of integration, because integration, as can be seen from the experience of our EU 
neighbors, requires ongoing attention and political decisions by the leaders. The bureaucratic machines are 
largely inclined to protect their own interests, thus decelerating integration; hence, political will is needed to 
keep the process running at the required pace (“The New Eurasian Economic Union will not be a simple sum 
of today’s legal framework and agreements reached”, Interfax News Agency, December 25th 2012).  
68 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Interview with Victor Khristenko: “Decisions are taken by the Commission on a 
collegial basis”, 12 May 2012. 
69 Ogonyok, “Interview with Viktor Khristenko”.  
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ontological security in Russia requires playing the role of regional leadership, 
demonstrating great power status and establishing a concentric circles model of politics 
across the Eurasian space. However, this approach clashes with Kazakhstan’s self-
perceptions of sovereignty and national statehood. Kazakhstan can react to boost its own 
ontological security by demonstrating its independence and ‘state-ness’, but in so doing 
risks undermining its own goals of inter-ethnic harmony across the Eurasian space, which is 
supposed to mirror that within Kazakhstan itself. This does not mean that Russia and 
Kazakhstan cannot cooperate, but it means that even a mutually agreed and 
accommodating position (such as the current status quo) may raise difficult ontological 
insecurities. By contrast, as the discussion of Kazakh celebrations of statehood 
demonstrates, regional tensions can be used to bolster collective ontological security, but 
at the expense of regional integration. While these examples refer to Eurasia, they raise a 
number of observations that are potentially relevant for other regions. First, regionalism 
can play a role in both strengthening and undermining ontological security. Because 
ontological security is concerned fundamentally with identity over time and because, as 
described, identity plays a key role in the development of legitimacy, regional integration 
and cooperation have the potential to both strengthen and undermine state legitimacy, 
including that of authoritarian states. The crucial dimension here is the impact of 
regionalism on ontological security. As noted in the Eurasian case, regional cooperation 
that reinforces identity and ontological security can boost state legitimacy, whereas 
regionalism that fosters a fundamental challenge to identity creates a situation in which a 
state must either reject or limit cooperation (so as to re-establish ontological security), or 
continue cooperating under terms that challenge ontological security, which may have 
negative repercussions for state leaders.  
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